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Informed Consent and the Role of the Treating Physician
Holly Fernandez Lynch, J.D., M.B.E., Steven Joffe, M.D., M.P.H., and Eric A. Feldman, J.D., Ph.D.
In the century since Justice Benjamin N. Cardozo 
famously declared that “[e]very human being of 
adult years and sound mind has a right to deter-
mine what shall be done with his own body,”1 
informed consent has become a central feature 
of American medical practice. In an increasingly 
team-based and technology-driven system, how-
ever, who is — or ought to be — responsible for 
obtaining a patient’s consent? Must the treating 
physician personally provide all the necessary 
disclosures, or can the consent process, like other 
aspects of modern medicine, take advantage of 
specialization and division of labor? Analysis of 
Shinal v. Toms, a recent Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court case, demonstrates the dangers of a narrow, 
rigid approach to consent.
Legal Trouble
In 2008, Dr. Steven Toms performed a total 
resection of a recurrent craniopharyngioma on 
Ms. Megan Shinal. During the procedure, he per-
forated her carotid artery, which led to perma-
nent severe neurologic injury. Ms. Shinal sued, 
claiming that Dr. Toms had failed to explain the 
risks of the surgery and that had she known that 
a lower-risk subtotal resection was an option, 
she would have pursued that alternative instead.2
Dr. Toms testified at trial that during an initial 
consultation, he had discussed with Ms. Shinal 
her goals and the risks and benefits of total 
versus subtotal resection, including the potential 
harm that ultimately occurred. Ms. Shinal de-
cided to undergo surgery, but the question of 
whether to proceed with total versus subtotal 
resection was at that time unresolved.2
Ms. Shinal subsequently spoke with Dr. Toms’s 
physician assistant about scarring, the cranioto-
my incision, potential radiation, and the date for 
surgery. Thereafter, she signed a consent form 
that gave Dr. Toms permission to perform “a 
resection of recurrent craniopharyngioma” and 
that identified the risks of the surgery as includ-
ing “injury and death,” among others. The form 
indicated that Ms. Shinal had discussed the risks 
and benefits of alternative treatments, that she had 
been given the opportunity to ask questions, and 
that she had been given sufficient information 
to make her decision. However, the form did not 
specifically address the differential risks of the 
two surgical options.2
The jury was instructed that when assessing 
whether Dr. Toms had satisfied his legal duty to 
obtain consent, it could consider information that 
had been communicated to Ms. Shinal “by any 
qualified person acting as [his] assistant . . . .” 
The jury returned a verdict in the doctor’s favor, 
which was affirmed by the intermediate appel-
late court. However, in June 2017, a divided 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court reached a different 
conclusion. In a 4-to-3 decision, it held that a 
physician may not “fulfill through an intermedi-
ary the duty to provide sufficient information to 
obtain a patient’s informed consent,” such that 
the jury instruction at trial had been incorrect.2
In reaching that conclusion, the Shinal major-
ity opinion pointed to Pennsylvania precedent 
holding that a hospital has no duty to obtain a 
patient’s informed consent, because “only the 
physician who performs the operation on the 
patient” bears that duty.3 Although that previous 
case did not address whether the physician must 
personally execute the duty, the Shinal majority 
took it to mean that a physician cannot rely on 
a subordinate to make requisite consent disclo-
sures.2 In particular, the majority expressed con-
cern about the “primacy of the physician–patient 
relationship,” arguing that “[w]ithout direct dia-
logue and a two-way exchange between physi-
cian and patient, the physician cannot be confi-
T h e  n e w  e ngl a nd  j o u r na l  o f  m e dic i n e
n engl j med 378;25 nejm.org June 21, 20182434
dent that the patient comprehends the [necessary 
information].”2
The majority opinion also referred to the rele-
vant statutory text in the Pennsylvania Medical 
Care Availability and Reduction of Error (MCARE) 
Act, which provides that “a physician owes a 
duty” to obtain a patient’s informed consent be-
fore performing surgery, inserting a surgical de-
vice, administering an experimental product or 
using an approved product in an experimental 
manner, or administering anesthesia, radiation, 
chemotherapy, or a blood transfusion.4 On the 
basis of this explicit reference to the physician, 
the majority held that the plain language of the 
statute requires treating physicians to satisfy 
their informed-consent duty directly and that 
conversations between the patient and others are 
irrelevant to satisfaction of the physician’s duty. 
With this holding, the court overruled earlier 
Pennsylvania cases holding that the validity of 
consent does not depend on the identity of the 
person making the disclosures.5,6
Elsewhere in the statute, the MCARE Act pro-
vides that “[c]onsent is informed if the patient 
has been given a description of” the relevant 
procedure and its risks and alternatives.4 The 
dissenting opinion in Shinal seized on that pas-
sive language to argue that the statute does not 
specify who must provide patients with the rele-
vant information and that “physicians should 
not be needlessly charged with the responsibility 
of being involved personally with every conceiv-
able aspect of their practices that may assist 
them in informing their patients’ consent.”7
The majority and dissent both agreed that the 
treating physician bears the duty to obtain pa-
tient consent; the disagreement was about how 
this duty may be discharged. Since Shinal, Pennsyl-
vania physicians are legally required to perform 
this duty on their own. Because the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court is the highest court in the state, 
its interpretation of the law is not appealable. 
The case has been returned to the lower court 
for a new trial under the legal standard set forth 
by the majority’s ruling.
Implic ations in Pennsylvania  
and Beyond
Shinal has already had a profound effect in Penn-
sylvania, where it represents a substantial depar-
ture from typical consent practice. More than 
half the physicians who responded to a recent 
survey conducted by the Pennsylvania Medi-
cal Society (PAMED) reported a change in the 
informed-consent process in their work setting; 
of that group, the vast majority expressed dis-
content with the effect of the new approach on 
patient f low and the way patients are served.8 
Medical centers throughout the state have 
changed their consent policies, precluding non-
physicians from obtaining patient consent to 
the procedures specified in the MCARE Act and 
sometimes restricting the involvement of physi-
cian trainees. Some Pennsylvania institutions 
have also applied the Shinal holding to research, 
in light of the reference in the MCARE Act to 
experimental products and uses, despite the 
clear policy of the Food and Drug Administra-
tion (FDA) allowing investigators to involve other 
staff in the consent process.9,10 The PAMED has 
indicated its intention to pursue legislative advo-
cacy in response to the decision,8 but there has 
been no legislative action to date.
Although the Shinal decision is not binding 
outside of Pennsylvania, cases bearing on criti-
cal ethical dimensions of consent have a history 
of influence beyond their own jurisdictions.1,11 
We believe that Shinal has similar potential, 
especially because other state laws also include 
language that could be interpreted as requiring 
that disclosure be made directly by the treating 
provider (Table 1). Attorneys familiar with Ms. 
Shinal’s success in Pennsylvania are likely to ad-
vance similar arguments in other states, perhaps 
successfully.
Even if Shinal is not a harbinger of a na-
tional trend, the case invites a broader conver-
sation and careful analysis of unresolved ethical 
questions regarding the “who” and “how” of in-
formed consent; these questions have received 
substantially less attention than the matter of 
“what” must be disclosed and understood. Should 
the Pennsylvania legislature allow the Shinal hold-
ing to stand? Should other states adopt the 
approach delineated by Shinal? We think not. 
We believe there are many ways to ensure that 
patients have the information and support they 
need to make decisions that cohere with their 
preferences — the ultimate goal of informed 
consent — without mandating that treating 
physicians exercise their consent duty alone, 
absent assistance from other members of the 
care team.
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State Statutory Language Relevant Case Law Analysis
Pennsylvania “. . . a physician owes a duty to a patient to 
 obtain the informed consent of the patient  
or the patient’s authorized representative 
 prior to conducting [various procedures].”4
“Consent is informed if the patient has been given 
[the required information]. The physician shall 
be entitled to present evidence of the descrip­
tion of that procedure and those risks and alter­
natives that a physician acting in accordance 
with accepted medical standards of medical 
practice would provide.”4
Valles v. Albert Einstein Medical 
Center: Hospitals do not owe 
a duty of informed consent, 
which is held only by the 
treating physician.3
Shinal v. Toms: The duty to obtain 
patient consent may be per­
formed only by the treating 
physician.2
The statutory language clearly recog­
nizes the physician’s duty but is 
 ambiguous as to whether the physi­
cian must directly disclose the rele­
vant consent information. The Valles 
case did not specify how the physi­
cian’s consent duty must be dis­
charged. Both the Shinal majority 
and dissent interpretations of the 
statutory text are plausible.
New York “Lack of informed consent means the failure of 
the person providing the professional treat­
ment or diagnosis to disclose to the patient 
such alternatives thereto and the reasonably 
foreseeable risks and benefits involved as a 
reasonable medical, dental or podiatric prac­
titioner under similar circumstances would 
have disclosed, in a manner permitting the 
patient to make a knowledgeable evaluation.”12
Hoffson v. Orentreich11: The stat­
ute does not expressly pre­
clude use of an agent to pro­
vide information to a patient 
on behalf of the treating pro­
vider (relying on a pre­Shinal 
Pennsylvania case5).
The New York statutory language could 
be viewed as more stringent than 
the Pennsylvania statute, because  
it directly references who is to dis­
close the relevant consent informa­
tion. However, in Hoffson, a New 
York court (not the highest court in 
the state) interpreted the law flexibly 
to allow disclosure by others.
Oregon “In order to obtain the informed consent of a pa­
tient, a physician or physician assistant shall 
explain the following: (a) In general terms the 
procedure or treatment to be undertaken; (b) 
That there may be alternative procedures or 
methods of treatment, if any; and (c) That there 
are risks, if any, to the procedure or treatment.”13
“After giving the [initial explanation], the physician 
or physician assistant shall ask the patient if 
the patient wants a more detailed explanation. 
If the patient requests further explanation, the 
physician or physician assistant shall disclose 
in substantial detail the procedure, the viable 
alternatives and the material risks unless to do so 
would be materially detrimental to the patient.”13
No relevant case law identified. The Oregon statute specifically refer­
ences physician assistants, which 
could make it more permissive than 
the reference only to physicians in 
the Pennsylvania statute. However, 
it is unclear whether the intent is to 
allow physician assistants to perform 
consent tasks on behalf of physicians 
in general or only when the physician 
assistant is performing a medical 
service directly for a patient.
Texas “. . . the physician or health care provider shall 
disclose to the patient or person authorized 
to consent for the patient the risks and hazards 
involved . . . .”14
“Health care provider” includes any person or in­
stitution licensed to provide health care in the 
state.14
Statutory requirements are satisfied if consent is 
given in writing, signed by the patient or autho­
rized representative, and “the written consent 
specifically states the risks and hazards.”14
Vaughan v. Nielson15: The physi­
cian is responsible for the 
“propriety” of the form, but 
Texas cases have “consis­
tently held” that nothing in 
the statute requires a physi­
cian to personally promulgate 
that form.
Intermediate appellate courts in Texas 
have interpreted this statute flexibly 
to date, and the language may be 
more permissive than that for Pennsyl­
vania, given the specific mention of 
other health care providers and the 
emphasis on written consent mate­
rials. However, mention of other 
health care providers could be inter­
preted as relevant only when there 
is no physician involved (e.g., for den­
tal or chiropractic care) or in reference 
to institutional consent obligations.
Wisconsin “Any physician who treats a patient shall inform 
the patient about the availability of reason­
able alternate medical modes of treatment 
and about the benefits and risks of these 
treatments.”16
Brooks v. Physicians Insurance 
Company of Wisconsin, Inc.17: 
The obligation to obtain con­
sent lies with the physician. 
Here, the physician discussed 
the relevant procedures with 
the patient. The law does not 
require the physician to direct­
ly obtain the patient’s signa­
ture on the consent form.
Rubedor v. Kopp18: At trial, permit­
ting a jury instruction that the 
treating physician may “dele­
gate to another physician the 
informed consent process,” but 
must verify adequate disclosure.
Like the New York statute, this statute 
explicitly refers to disclosures by the 
treating physician, which is more 
stringent than the Pennsylvania 
statute. Relevant case law (although 
not from the highest court in the 
state) has permitted some flexibility, 
noting that disclosure by the treat­
ing physician is adequate to satisfy 
the duty even if someone else ob­
tains the patient’s signature. At 
least one trial court has permitted 
disclosure by someone other than 
the treating physician.
Table 1. Selected State Informed-Consent Laws.
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Promoting High- Qualit y Informed 
Consent through Teamwork
Achieving high-quality informed consent is com-
plex.19 It requires patients who have the capacity 
to make the relevant decisions and circumstances 
that facilitate voluntary choice. It also requires 
adequate disclosure of material information to 
patients, as well as their comprehension of that 
information and an ability to fit it into the 
larger context of their lives and goals.20 To 
achieve these ends, health professionals seeking 
consent must have sufficient expertise, judgment, 
and training to know what to disclose and how 
to respond to questions.19 Strong communica-
tion skills are critical, as is adequate time.19 In a 
Department of Veterans Affairs study of 575 
patients scheduled for elective surgeries, 60% of 
consent conversations took 10 minutes or more, 
and shorter conversations were associated with 
a substantial decrement in patient comprehen-
sion.21 However, the National Ambulatory Medi-
cal Care Survey showed that, in 2015, patients 
spent 15 minutes or less with the physician at 
43% of office visits and spent 16 to 30 minutes 
with the physician at 42% of visits,22 during 
which time a variety of activities had to be ac-
complished. Time is also relevant in the sense 
that leading consent discussions is a skill that 
must be practiced and perfected — it is not 
automatically bestowed on newly minted physi-
cians.23
Consider that at present, “physicians and pa-
tients rarely achieve the theoretical ideal”19 when 
it comes to informed consent, “physician-led 
informed consent discussions are often ill-timed 
or ineffective,”24 and in outpatient practice, few 
patient decisions are adequately informed.25 Per-
haps with more time physicians would do better, 
but this could result in longer wait times, more 
difficulty securing appointments, and higher 
costs.7,8 From the patient’s perspective, physi-
cians’ time may be better spent on those special-
ized tasks that only they have the skill to per-
form, while other members of the team 
participate in the consent process as they do in 
other clinical tasks for which they are appropri-
ately trained and supervised. This is not to sug-
gest that we place efficiency above the quality of 
consent in terms of importance or priority; in-
stead, we maintain that both goals can be 
achieved simultaneously.
Other members of the care team — including 
physician assistants, nurses, and others — often 
possess the skills and characteristics needed to 
conduct or enhance a high-quality discussion of 
consent.26 Accordingly, we believe it is ethically 
acceptable, and ought to be legally permissible, 
to allow treating physicians to rely on these 
team members for help in performing their con-
sent duties. For example, the treating physician 
could describe the patient’s options at a high 
level and make a preliminary recommendation 
for an appropriate course of treatment. A quali-
fied professional under the physician’s supervi-
sion could then educate the patient further about 
the risks and benefits of relevant alternatives, 
with substantial attention to eliciting the patient’s 
values and goals. Finally, the treating physician 
could rejoin this ongoing process to address any 
remaining questions and uncertainties, assisting 
the patient in confirming a final decision.20 We 
suspect that the patient would probably emerge 
from this process more informed and would 
make a decision with more confidence than 
would have been possible after a short office visit 
with the treating physician. Indeed, although the 
Shinal majority expressed concern that allowing 
physicians to “delegate the provision of critical 
information to staff” could “undermine patient 
autonomy and bodily integrity by depriving the 
patient of the opportunity to engage in a dialogue 
with his or her chosen health care provider,”2 the 
approach suggested here would offer the patient 
support in reaching the best decision.
Maintaining a Nondelegable Dut y
Although we argue that the treating physician 
may ethically seek the assistance of others in 
performing the tasks involved in obtaining con-
sent, delegating those tasks does not necessarily 
entail delegating ultimate responsibility. The 
tasks may be shared, but we maintain that the 
responsibility for achieving the goal of consent 
— an informed decision that accords with the 
patient’s values and priorities — belongs to the 
treating physician alone.
To understand this distinction, consider two 
approaches to informed consent: “passing the 
buck” versus “the buck stops here.” In the for-
mer, the treating physician is permitted to fully 
delegate the responsibility to obtain informed 
consent to others, so that if something goes 
wrong, the person to whom the duty was dele-
gated is held responsible. In the latter, the treat-
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ing physician cannot delegate the responsibility 
— only the tasks. If the person to whom the 
tasks are delegated fails, the treating physician 
remains responsible. Which approach is pref-
erable?
If the buck is passed in the sense that the 
consent duty itself is transferred from the treat-
ing physician to others, there is a risk that re-
sponsibility will be diffused, leading to confusion, 
error, and potentially conflicting information.27 
Just as it is important to have a single party who 
is responsible for coordinating a patient’s care 
when various competent specialists are involved, 
it seems important to have someone who is ulti-
mately responsible for the informed consent 
process — someone who oversees the process 
and is held accountable for failures. Moreover, 
imposing liability on the treating physician 
should help ensure that patients’ needs are satis-
fied and their rights to autonomy protected, 
because it provides incentives for both the estab-
lishment of good consent practices and appro-
priate oversight in individual cases. We argue 
that if others who have been tapped to take part 
in the consent process do a sufficient job, the 
treating physician’s duty should be deemed satis-
fied, even if the treating physician merely as-
signed the relevant tasks. However, we maintain 
that if those with whom the treating physician 
shares the tasks involved in obtaining consent 
perform inadequately, the buck should stop with 
the treating physician. This is precisely the ap-
proach advocated by the Shinal dissent, which 
argued that “[i]f qualified staff is somehow 
negligent in aiding a physician in informing a 
patient’s consent, then the physician remains 
liable . . . .”7
There is one legal caveat: in most states (al-
though not Pennsylvania),3 a physician’s institu-
tion also may be liable for failures to obtain in-
formed consent, in addition to or instead of the 
physician. But the important point here is that, 
in our view, the buck should never be passed 
down from the treating physician to supporting 
staff.
Recommendations
Despite the understandable impulse to avoid 
litigation, we believe it is a mistake to allow the 
consent process to be shaped by fear of liability,7 
encouraging repetition of shared tasks just to be 
on the “safe side.” This approach risks eliminat-
ing the benefits to the patient and the gains in 
efficiency associated with relying on others. In-
stead, we propose that treating physicians should 
do two things. First, we suggest that they estab-
lish the right structures to support those with 
whom they plan to share the tasks involved in 
consent. Do the supporting actors have the 
training, expertise, tools, and time necessary to 
perform their portion of the consent process? 
Do they know what is expected of them? The 
treating physician may wish to audit the process 
periodically, but assuming all is in order, we 
argue the physician should feel confident that 
the duty to secure consent is being adequately 
discharged. Second, we suggest that the treating 
physician should, before performing the proce-
dure in question, speak with the patient to con-
firm that consent discussions have indeed taken 
place with the appropriate people, that all ques-
tions have been answered, and that the patient 
is secure in the ultimate treatment decision. We 
are not proposing elimination of “direct dia-
logue” or “two-way exchange between the physi-
cian and patient,” as the Shinal majority feared2; 
there is a middle ground between permitting 
abdication of physician engagement and refus-
ing in a court of law to consider information 
provided to a patient by anyone other than the 
treating physician.
In our view, the insistence of the Shinal major-
ity that the treating physician personally provide 
all consent-related disclosures is an anachronism 
in a team-based health care system.7 Allowing 
the tasks involved in consent to be shared with 
qualified professionals, while holding the treat-
ing physician responsible for achieving the goals 
of consent, should facilitate informed decision 
making by the patient while enabling physicians 
to preserve time for other clinical functions that 
only they can perform. We expect that such an 
approach will redound to the benefit of all pa-
tients.
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